From the original article on November 29, 2020. Author: Julius Branson.
How history works is a question that has been severely neglected. It is true that in the past, understanding of history was limited due to insufficient data. But it is possible that the time of too little historical knowledge has come to an end. Peter Turchin is one of the most famous and recent thinkers to study this question, performing work that attempts to quantify and predict the macro-level process of history much like those Spengler studied. While it is likely that there is a “cycle” to history, the definite form of the times in this cycle as well as their relative lengths and magnitudes should be a function of the phenotypes of the historical decision makers. Therefore, knowing the structure of the “micro-level” processes of history is the key to manipulation and true understanding of the broad cycles of decline and collapse. To say that population explosion leads to unrest is trivial; to be able to predict the colour of that unrest and who its phenotypic agents will be is empowering.
Understanding the micro-level processes of history involves nothing less than understanding the power structure of human society and how it varies with time, if it varies at all. The parameters of this structure and its varying forms should be able to be fleshed out analytically, with minimal empirical content. For if the questions posed about the power structure have meaning, then they are valid questions and the proposed tests will serve their purpose in elucidating the truth. The tests will even reveal if there is no power structure at all, unless the questions were to be improperly predicated on the assumption of certain empirical facts.
“Power” should be defined before asking who has it and how they wield it: a person who has power over another is one who can have the other do as he pleases. The way in which this is achieved is the mechanism by which power is wielded. Thus, a father who can make his child behave as he wants has power over that child, but if he lacks the ability to shape the child’s behavior, he lacks power. The mechanism by which that power is wielded can vary from subtle influence to explicit reward to explicit punishment. Let it suffice to say that any action which the father does that shapes his child’s behavior is a mechanism of his power over that child.
But what is the shaping of a child’s behavior? Assuming the standard model of behavior genetics for behavior (P = G + E + G*E [GxE for short]) sheds light on this: the father has influenced the child’s behavior when he is a significant environmental factor that contributes to his child’s behavioral phenotype. But this means “power” is often far from absolute – for in any conversation, each participant has power over the other in that each influences the behavior of the other in that moment. But this power is neither very strong nor stable. Nor is there really much of a power differential – the power of each participant over the other is roughly equal compared to that of a father over a child.
It may be said more formally that the magnitude and the stability of the power a talking partner has over the other clearly differs from that of the father over the child. Let magnitude roughly refer to the answer to the question, “how big is the set of behavior that this power can cause in the subject?” This is a meaningful question – it’s obvious that that the conversation partner can probably cause a smaller set of set of behaviors than the father can cause in the child. The other meaningful question is, “how long will the power persist?” It is intuitive that a father has less “power” over a 17 year old than a 14 year old even divorced from whether or not the old teen can drive or work a job. So too does a stable State have more power over its citizenry than one on the edge of collapse, even if its laws continue to be largely enforced on the populace to the same extent until the collapse.
For any individual, there’s also the question as to how many people he has power over. Absolute power over 1000 is “more” power than absolute power over 1. Partial power over 1000 intuitively seems to be “more” than absolute power over a few. Let it suffice to simply recognize these three variables of power – particular equations don’t need to be surmised at this time.
If history is the record of behaviors of a population, then it’s reasonable to ask what the distribution of power is in that population. If ΣP = Σ(GxE) then in order to make sense of the behavior of a population, the extent to which power constitutes a significant environmental variable is required. And then if it is known who has power and who is subjected to it, ΣP of the subjects can be better predicted by incorporating Σ(GxE) of their masters.
So far it has not been assumed that anyone actually has power. Inquiry could reveal that power is distributed evenly or near-evenly, and ΣP is therefore an emergent property of the unweighted aggregate of genomes and their environments. One genotype-in-an-environment (phenotype) might not unduly influence a large set of genotypes-in-an-environment such that the former phenotype receives weighting when ΣP is “calculated.” But if one phenotype does unduly influence (have power over) another set of phenotypes, then power is unevenly distributed to some degree that the former genotype’s X environment is more important when determining the aggregate behavior of the population. If the powerful phenotype varies significantly from the average phenotype, then looking at the average genotype in the average environment and predicting change in ΣP based on change in the average genotype or environment will be misleading. What would be more revealing to the extent that power is unevenly distributed would be to examine the environment and genotype of the powerful and how they change.
Since we have already elucidated how we might quantify an individual’s amount of “power,” it is meaningful to ask about the distribution of power in a group of people. Take a set of five people. If none of them know each other, then they all probably have little to no power over the others. If there is one charismatic leader, that individuals might have a great level of power over the other four, while the other four fail to influence any other member to a great extent. Any combination between these extremes can be modelled. In each, variance from the mean can be calculated in the normal way. If everyone has the same amount of power, that variance is 0. If one person has a lot of power, the variance is larger. Furthermore, the distribution can be examined. There may be no discernable pattern if everyone has wildly varying amounts of power. But if there is a large group with a uniform, small amount of power and a small group with a large amount of power, examining the distribution of power in that group will show how concentrated it is. The extent to which power is concentrated in the hands of the few can even be quantified, perhaps by reporting what percent of the population possesses the top 50% of the power.
Let the concept, the extent to which power is concentrated in the hands of a few, be called centralization. At some moment in time, a society is more centralized the smaller the fraction of people is that possess significant influence. If in some society the media and law enforcement were responsible for 99% of the influence people receive (and that influence is responsible for a large amount of how most people behave), and only about 100 people dictate what is the law and what is on TV, then that society is more centralized then one where the top 20% of the population effectively decide what is on TV and what is the law. In everyday terms, centralization is simply a function of how many people “have power” or how many “matter to history.”
To investigate centralization, we must question the extent to which the average person’s behavior is dictated by power. If this amount is significant, then we must determine what the power differential is between the average person and their collection of influences. Finally, we must determine how many people have power over the average person.
If centralization is a function of other, more directly observable variables, then we can deduce that the extent to which centralization varies between time and place depends on the extent to which those variables vary. If centralization is a consequence of a rather fixed trait of all members of the human species, then it follows that centralization would not vary from time and place significantly. If it were moreso a consequence of technological progress, then it follows that centralization would have significantly differed in the past.
What kinds of tests can be performed in order to determine the extent of centralization in some time period and what determines it? Any test or set of tests that allows for a valid approximation of the distribution of power in a population suffices for the purpose of approximating the extent of centralization is some time and place. Suppose a study in the US of 2020 revealed that media exposure significantly predicts the average person’s political behavior – how they vote, what they care about. Media significantly modulates public opinion and not the other way around. Then, if what is in the media is a function of the desires of a small group of billionaires who collectively control the media through only 5 corporations, we can deduce that the US of 2020 is highly centralized. A sub-Dunbar amount of people greatly influence the public opinion of a population of 350 million. In a representative democracy, this leads to changes in the law. By syllogism, this small clique effectively controls the law in addition to the media, which has been shown to be a highly important factor for how people behave. On the other hand, if the US were not highly centralized in 2020, it would be expected that studies would show that the media has little causal effect on what people believe. In this case, maybe what is in the media is a function of what the average person believes. That in turn is shown to be a function of an environmental variable like technological progress. Maybe the financing of political campaigns is inefficient. Maybe studies show that when the super-rich and the average person wants different things, the average person tends to win. In these cases we can infer that the distribution of power is quite even. There is no sign that a small group hold a large amount of power. We should then conclude that the US of 2020 is pretty decentralized.
Knowledge of historical events may also be used as a test. If it can be inferred through examination of events which seem to be “grassroots” that “elite” influence is a necessary condition of said events, then it may be said that for the time and place where that inference is valid, there is a high degree of centralization. Furthermore, if we take the set of events from the 20th century that are deemed to be important and we trace their causes, and we find that decisions were virtually always made by the wealthy or for the wealthy with little regard to popularity, then the US in the 20th century may be inferred to have been highly centralized. So too if it is revealed that a small group makes the decisions, and the people lack significant power over those people, then the US is highly centralized. This means that if a study found chronically low approval ratings for elected officials who nonetheless continue to behave stably as a group, we can say the US is centralized if those officials control something of immense power such as the State apparatus. If, on the other hand, successful movements of change rarely, if ever, have elite funding, and representative democracy were found to yield majority approval ratings of the government, and the most important decisions of the recent past were made by the masses or for fear of the masses, then we should say that it would appear that the US is quite decentralized.
Just how centralized the US should also be able to be approximated with these methods. Of course it is possible that while centralized, the US could be essentially ruled by 5% of the population. If this is the case, then important decisions should be made for fear of these people or by these people without significant influence by the hyper-rich. They should approve of the decisions made by the US government. If the media matters, the structure of it should be such that this 5% controls it. Popular movements should have to be supported by these people but not necessarily the super-rich in order to succeed. Hypothetical direct examination of these people should reveal an independence of will at the group-level; they are not unduly influenced by the hyper-rich.
With the same or similar tests, we can approximate the factors behind centralization. If a major piece of evidence is the power of the media, then perhaps it is a probable hypothesis that centralization was less when media technology was less sophisticated. If the need of social movements for elite patronage were another strong piece of evidence, then perhaps centralization varies from time and place with how equally wealth is distributed. Of course, it could all balance out if there are a number of important factors behind centralization.
In a society with a power distribution that exists such that the society may fairly be called centralized, there should be large gaps in power between the few and the many to the extent that there is a power threshold that a person must cross in order to be “Important” or significant in regards to predicting history. Beyond this threshold there still may be power differentials among the few. Even small power differentials, or even the existence of influence but no power differential, can lead to “coordination,” a term that is here defined as the extent to which the powerful influence each other. A centralized but uncoordinated society features an atomized elite wherein introducing a new environmental factor to one will hardly have an overall effect (assuming the society is not ruled by few enough people). But a centralized and coordinated society can suffer from activist elites dominating neutral elites. If the coordination is hierarchical, people that may seem equally powerful from the outside may not be equal at all. One may matter much more than the other; the one may be a puppet and the other a puppet master, or alternatively the two may be master and apprentice. This was the condition of American society during the Revolutionary era. Virtually all of the leaders were Free Masons; among them therefore were Master and Apprentice. Their coordination was not only formal and hierarchical, but also semi-secret. The extent to which coordination is secret may be termed as the extent to which there is conspiracy. Names on the Declaration of Independence were nowhere near equal, yet each partook in the share of centralized power to some degree (if we suppose the society was centralized). This is all trivial to demonstrate. Among any group, including the one that possesses centralized power, the extent to which that group is coordinated is simply a question of the power distribution within the group (although there are indirect signs as well: the ability to reproduce the group will without family, obvious signs of acting in unison that cannot be explained by common genes and environment, etc.) Where the major disagreement comes is in regards to the idea that the list of Masonic names which fills the history books actually had centralized power. If society was actually decentralized, and these people were merely the representatives of some emergent will of the society-in-an-environment, then the coordination hardly matters, secret or not. The genotypes of these few people did not necessarily play an amplified role in history. But if power is centralized, if there is an influence differential, then the mass did not need to want a revolution. It is possible, even probable, that the American Revolution was a result of the desire of a few people in a few unique environments. Discourse about mass ideas would then be meaningless: what was predictive was the will of the few.
Therefore let the centralization of society be put to the test. Consider a typical historical text. How many names are found in it, and what are those people like? Making a list should be unnecessary. Obviously there are very few names in history books, and those that are in them overwhelmingly tend to by high status and wealthy. But occasionally there are histories with no names, where only events are discussed and it is assumed that they are the result of some ideological dissemination or technological development. Other times it is claimed that the high status men of history are merely the representatives of “the people.” In the former case, the small group of people making the decisions is simply obscured. The Roman Senate is hidden behind “Rome.” Is the latter case plausible? How often in history are these men overthrown if they fail to express the will of the people? The mystery of power is that they are hardly ever. What members of the public desired Stalin’s rule, even upon joining the Red Army in the early days of their revolution? Which among even the Roman upper class desires the many clownish emperors of Rome in later days? Surely not many. If not somehow concentrated solely in the hands of Stalin, surely power must have been centralized, since what terrorized commoners would have not used any available influence to displace the tyrant? And the Russian Revolution which overthrew the Tsar was carried out men of more intelligence and status, even if they weren’t quite elite. More than that, however, they had the backing of American bankers and agents of the German government (Sutton 1981, 172). These things were largely obscured from the public. So how could they have been emergent from it? When such few men wield such power as to finance a revolution, knowing their personal vicissitudes becomes integral to the understanding of history.
“But what if the funding was just aid and not a necessary condition? How could a revolution have been carried out if the people were unwilling to perform it?” Power is influence. When there is centralized power over a mass, that mass can be made to do things it wouldn’t otherwise do. Communism as a doctrine originated among elite minds funded by elite wealth (Antelman 2002, 13): Marx was supported not by the workers of the world but by his uncle Lion Philips, grandfather of the brothers who started Philips Electronics. What workers were there among the early Communists? Class consciousness was a major problem discussed among these rich, often Jewish, ideologues. To my own knowledge, there were not any members of the working class lifted up and funded for their support of Communism; the whole movement was created by an elite class. It is claimed that the League of Just, which paid Marx and Engels to write the Communist Manifesto, was set up in part by bankers such as the Schiffs and Warburgs (Antelman 1974, 21), who were also heavily involved in the dissemination of Reform Judaism among the Jewish masses, a process which involved a clear showing of centralized influence. Regardless of whatever evidence exists tying these ultra-rich figures to Communism, even Wikipedia states that the primary members of the League of Just consisted of the upper class: academics, physicians, merchants, and so on. But more than this, there is a letter from a man named Herzen, a Russian Communist agitator, to Marx’s mentor, the “Zionist Socialist” Moses Hess. In this letter Herzen speaks of a “moment” – that is, the culmination of the desired revolution in Russia – and also his connection to members of the Rothschild banking family (Antelman 2002, 42). It would appear that a group of rich Jews were the first to desire a Communist revolution in Russia. Did the masses ever stand a chance? Perhaps with the protection of a strong monarchy, but WWI destroyed any semblance of that.
Enough of this digression away from modern America. Maybe things were different from Russian serfs. Maybe everyone wanted a Communist revolution except the dirty old Tsar. Perhaps the rich Jews responded no differently to the environment than the Russian masses and their support simply made the inevitable more stylish among the upper class. This is unlikely, but it is the way many seem to think. On the other hand, if the obvious is true, then the Communist revolution happened because of the influence of a select few. And given the outcomes of that revolution, it’s doubtful that these men were just altruists. Some, however, express skepticism at the idea that anyone actually believes themselves to be the “bad guy.” This skepticism is fair, but it is not my claim that the Rothschilds or the activists or the writers thought themselves to be that bad guys. It is possible for a group of people to practice deception for what they think is the greater good; the success of their race, for instance. And do people not have a great ability to deceive themselves?
Only with the assumption that one chain of events is representative of them all will talk about Russia shed light on the current state of the West. This assumption indeed may not be a bad one, but here we seek more than assumptions.
It is the case that, in general, propaganda is highly effective. Attentive lived experience should prove as much. But there is more objective evidence as well: for instance, “woke-related term-usage [in the MSM] significantly predicts subsequent racial liberalism [popular opinion] while racial liberalism does not significantly predict subsequent term-usage” (Goldberg 2020). In other words, the mainstream media caused public opinion on race to morph into what it is today. This power should be extensive; while the media is not necessarily the culprit behind every shift in public opinion, it is a strong possibility that where there is a shift, the media is to blame, especially when that shift is to the “left.” Regardless, the fact is that the media wields a massive amount of influence on the populace, which is just another way of saying there must be some significant level of centralization. The question now becomes: “who controls the media?” It could be the case that a broad upper class of around, say, 5% are integral to the media, and it was merely natural change in the beliefs of this somewhat large group that led to wokeism in the media. Furthermore, who’s to say that natural change wouldn’t have come to the masses anyway? Maybe the above evidence is just an illusion. Maybe the professional class was simply effected first.
It is unlikely that some “natural change” could make white people hate themselves. I can’t think of anything but top down social pressure that would spur the white masses to say “please call me evil, discriminate against me in hiring and education, and eliminate my bloodline!” The honest should admit without studies that not the automobile, nor the radio, nor TV, nor the birth control pill, nor the internet, nor social media, nor any other technology or geopolitical situation could produce this result. So what if there is Twitter and TV and radio? That doesn’t imply women or black people should be allowed to vote. Further evidence can confer more certainty onto this hypothesis: specifically, evidence relating to just how influenceable the average person is. If the typical person is highly influenceable, and indeed highly influenced, then it would be unreasonable to doubt the power of having control over the average person’s media.
The above charts reveal a seemingly paradoxical pattern: as women and blacks get younger or more educated, they report more discrimination. How could this be when society has been obsessed with making things equitable for these groups? It can’t be. The reality is that education and other routes of influence are making Millennials and Gen Xers feel more discriminated against than women born before the Sexual Revolution and blacks born before “Civil Rights.”
This evidence seems to indicate people are influenceable to a significant extent. Startling evidence from generations ago corroborates this hypothesis: the well-known Asch conformity experiments (Asch 1951). In these studies, participants were literally shown a set of a few lines with clearly visible differences in length and were asked to tell which one was the longest or shortest. The catch was that for every trial, there were a number of fake subjects who were coached to give answers which were visibly incorrect. It was found that 37% of people would comply with the group and consistently lie, and only 25% would go against the astroturfed shills. The rest would lie some of the time. These studies are telling not only because they show that people will blatantly lie about mere line lengths in order to obey, but also because they demonstrate a possible model of the origination of mass delusion, one where the liars are shills paid by a Polish Jew named Solomon to deny basic reality, and where the cattle simply fall in line behind the centralized, top-down, and false reality.
If people are so influencable in a setting that, experimental method aside, should minimize conformity (the participants were knowingly participating in a psychological experiment, and the lies they were pressured to tell had no cost of not telling and were obvious), what chance do the majority of people stand against the Jewish question? The reality there is easier to ignore than the reality about the lengths of some lines. And who should study it, lest they be condemned by their close ones and the society at large? Surely a great number of people stand no chance of recognizing controversial truths, all because they are influenced by some lying group. But for there to be centralization, simple influenceability does not suffice; there must be a power differential, meaning that the influencables must have not simply influenced themselves. Some outside group with more influence-power per person must have caused the conformers to conform, as in the Asch line tests.
So the question remains: who controls the media? The people are surely influenced by it to a significant extent. To deny this would be to deny that people are so influenceable that they will lie about obvious sense-experiences. If somehow a small clique were able to decide the contents of 90+% of the media in a civilization, they could surely use that to significantly alter national “discourse” over time on questions more complicated than the length of lines.
Quite simply, the media is corporate and therefore structured in a top-down fashion. If journalists are allowed to initiate their own stories, that is only by the grace of their employers. The “Sinclair script” demonstrated this reality (Browich & Fortin 2018) – dozens of local news anchors who worked for channels with branding ranging from Fox to NBC to CBS that are owned by a corporation known as Sinclair Video were caught saying the same paragraph word-for-word: “Our greatest responsibility is to our [local community name] communities. We are extremely proud of the quality, balanced journalism that [channel name] produces. But, we are concerned about irresponsible, one sided news stories plaguing our countries … the sharing of biased and false news has become all too common on social media … this is extremely dangerous to our democracy.” Your local news anchors do not necessarily write their own scripts.
James Murdoch’s recent resignation letter is convergent with the Sinclair script. In it he writes, “I hereby tender my resignation as a member of the Board of Directors of News Corporation (the ‘Company’), effective as of the date hereof. My resignation is due to disagreements over certain editorial content published by the Company’s news outlets and certain other strategic decisions” (Murdoch 2020). This letter strongly implies the Board of Directors has direct control over editorial content published by all of the News Corporation’s outlets, and that it was and expected to be used.
This all heavily implies a power differential between the few owners of the media and the broad mass that consumes it, which includes many of the employees of the media companies, who lack autonomous executive capabilities. It is very easy for this small group at the top to unleash massive amounts of influence on the public, while the mass does not seem to possess as strong a means of counter-influencing. There is certainly a large power differential per person between the owners and the masses, and probably a power differential between the total influence capabilities of each group, in favor of the elite.
This is based off the observation that the media generally seems to do what benefits the elite and not the masses, when the two conflict. Spreading anti-white racism in a majority white country is a good example of this: Sean Last (2020) showed that media executives are at least a third Jewish, and that Jews tend to be extremely “liberal” (against whites). The large white population would probably be overall happier with the media if it weren’t so anti-white; even white liberals don’t seem to innately beg for anti-whiteness, but rather seem to simply go along with it in obedience due to high agreeableness.
And here we come to perhaps the strongest single piece of evidence in favor of centralization, a brute-force study published in 2014 that looked at thousands of American policy changes along with polling data and which divined what economic group’s preferences best predicted the changes on the aggregate.
The study revealed that the preferences of economic elites strongly predict policy change, while the preferences of average citizens plainly predict nothing (Gilens & Page 2014). Centralization to some significant extent is therefore the case, at least via the law. And if the law is controlled, it makes sense for the media to be as well. In fact, the numbers above imply that the preferences of average citizens are, to some real degree, created by the elite: considered alone, the preferences of average citizens do correlate with policy change, but that correlation totally vanishes in the multiple regression model.
The evidence, originating from diverse fields, converges to a single truth: that society is highly centralized. The masses are malleable, and are indeed malleableized. The evidence has furthermore given hints as to how centralization works; the masses are docile and obedient, their minds easily shaped by media and “education.” Money grants not only the power to control the media from the top down, but also the power to shape public policy somewhat independently from public opinion (which should then conform itself to policy in obedience).
Just how centralized is it then? The evidence implies “very.” Most congressmen are millionaires, and it takes hundreds of millions, if not billions, to continuously lobby. The media is similarly controlled by corporations whose owners are filthy rich. Wealth and ownership seem to be the key, the core of power. But I suppose it could still be conceivably argued that the upper-middle-intellectual class, the “5%,” are really the ones in power.
The answer to the question of coordination should be addressed first, before the absurd neo-reactionary idea that the professional managerial class are the ones with the power. Coordination is essentially nothing more than the quality and quantity of centralization among those thought to wield a significant portion of centralized power in a society: by definition, coordination varies based on the level of inter-influence and the extent of centralization among the powerful. An elite with high levels of inter-influence can be said to be coordinated, hierarchically so if there are significant power differentials, formally if there are institutions of coordination, and so on.
The economic elite are significantly socially interconnected, and in consequence, this group possesses high levels of inter-influence, meaning that, in the terminology developed here, they are highly coordinated. This coordination is, at the least, somewhat formal, and therefore easy to see: the multitude of elite clubs are the examples. These include the Council on Foreign Relations, the Bilderberg Group, Le Cercle, and the Bohemian Grove. Another group was exposed by Sutton (1983): the Skull and Bones Society. Both Presidential candidates in 2004 were members of this secretive Yale senior-fraternity. But this is no kid’s club – membership is forever and as Sutton outlines, it’s run by the elders, who pick college students for membership if they are to be welcomed into the world of the economic elite. They even give $15,000 to each new member! Club members swear allegiance to one another, and there are multiple instances of clear membership-based nepotism outlined by Sutton.
Historically, the Free Masons were very similar to the Skull and Bones Society. Now the membership pool is diluted, and most of the economic elite do not appear to be members of the society, but virtually every significant figure (all of whom were rich by the way) in the American Revolution was involved in in Masonry (Hagger 2003). In those days, the Masonic invitation taboo had not yet come about or was only recently invented (Robinson 1989), and the ability for one Mason to blackball a prospect would have kept out the riff raff either way. Also relevant is Robinson’s convincing argument that Masonry actually descended from the Knights Templar, a group of elite knights-gone-bankers who were purged by the Church in the 14th century but who largely escaped to Britain. The only likely alternative is that Masonry was founded by British State operatives around the time of Francis Bacon and the Rosicrucians, which was the early 17th century. The Rosicrucians were a Franco-German group similar to the Masons with serious ties to the British and the Protestant Bohemians (Yates 1972). It is with certainty that the Masons were active in the 17th century. Nonetheless, Robinson showed that, while there are records of other types of guilds, there are no records of there being stone mason guilds in Britain. Much of Masonic tradition appears to be derivative of the Knights Templar as well. As such, it is likely that there was a proto-masonic organization that existed in late medieval Britain that was derivative of the Knights Templar, and that Masonry proper was a version supported by British State operatives starting in the 17th century.
The point is that the elite have been coordinating forever. The Skull and Bones is only a recent iteration of this old type of pseudo-spiritual elite fraternity structure. The past and continued existence of such groups convincingly demonstrates that the elite coordinate in what is at least a semi-formal and semi-hierarchical fashion. If coordination were low or were not the case, then it would be expected that the elite should tend to interact on a class-blind basis. Any societies with elites should also be significantly composed of non-elites. Nepotism should be low. They should not meet to discuss and execute policy, yet they do in their numerous clubs.
The famous book, None Dare Call it Conspiracy (Allen and Abraham 1971), explained the founding of the Federal Reserve, a most centralized and coordinated event wherein lead bankers planned the policy in secret on Jekyll Island and then had it executed in Congress by their politicians. At the same time, those same politicians also legalized the federal income tax. Both policies were popularly resisted, but the nation succumbed nonetheless. The CFR was furthermore founded by absurdly rich financiers, and many presidential cabinets have been composed of its members. Despite its huge importance, the CFR receives no media scrutiny, and barely any coverage, as Allen and Abraham noted half a century ago.
None of this is expected if coordination is low. Even with high centralization, bankers 100 years ago should not have so easily met and discussed their plans, a meeting only in the public knowledge due to the admittance of it of some attendees. Low coordination would predict that the bankers would have all engaged in “mass action” in an “uncoordinated manor,” coming together “spontaneously” to achieve their “common interests,” without actually influencing one another. There should not be over 60 members of the CFR or the Bilderberg Group in Trump’s cabinet (a stable observation, as Allen and Abraham also lamented that Nixon’s cabinet was mostly composed of CFR members) And no, this is not a partisan phenomenon. The ruling class is a club, and you aren’t in it.
This is all enough to conclusively state that there are high levels of semi-formal and semi-hierarchical coordination among the elite. To whatever degree they are committed to progressive principles, they will enforce conformity on that point among the elite, attempting to ensure there are no defectors. New elite are often chosen consciously, even formally, such as when a young man is admitted into the Skull and Bones Society and later the CFR. The current elite can directly dictate who will be the elite of tomorrow to a significant degree, meaning they can make sure their biases live on.
These findings provide clues to the mystery of elite phenotype. While the neoserf or proletariat was shown to be stupid and docile, the average billionaire has an IQ of 130. High levels of coordination reveal high levels of class consciousness and power awareness. The elite actively seek to be among other elite, and organize as to retain their collective grip on power. That is, their meetings mainly serve as discussions regarding how to wield their power, and as control mechanisms that decide who may not partake in the power. In contrast, the neoserf is unaware of power, considering it a dirty word and himself equal to his master, which he paradoxically always obeys because he is so lacking in will. The neoserf is a most dirty and lowly slave who thinks he is free, while the elite is a self-aware master that consciously exerts his power.
Considering all of this, what may be said about the origins of progressivism? It has already been shown how journalists are beholden to the economic elite. Professors are as well. Most research funding comes from the rich. It is also the rich who sit on the board of directors of the schools thanks to their donations (this is little known, and was hard to find, but research who controls Harvard policy). Their grip over the means of propaganda is also enough to control the academy from afar. It is also the case that business leaders have so much control over the politicians, that in 1939 they were able to pass the Hatch Act, which prohibited civil service employees from engaging in certain forms of political activity, including the organization of donations (Quigley 1966).
Progressivism, then, is a project of the economic elite. The only question is why it appeals to them. It is a most unnatural ideology, at least for white middle class neoserfs, who eat it up so graciously only when served. It has always struck me that never would such a dumpster fire of an “ideology” ever emerge among white proles organically. The neoserf is low, but history shows that hatred of one’s own race is unprecedented, as are the sins against other traditions included in progressivism. It must be an alien phenomenon, pushed onto the rest by a few aberrations. This was always my intuition, and the evidence accumulated here supports it more or less.
The relevant gene pool that progressivism must naturally appeal to is small. Generally, for a set of behaviors to “appeal” to a gene pool, it must be instrumental to its existence and dominance, unless that gene pool is so mutated that it is killing itself. A gene pool such as the elite gene pool is also more likely than the population gene pool to function for dominance. It is a fit gene pool that seeks power.
Progressivism proper is most clearly instrumental to and supported by the Jewish element of the elite gene pool, and is tolerated by the white capitalist element. It was created, then, to secure and exalt the Jewish element of the elite gene pool, and the elite generally (as are all dominant ideologies). This is why progressivism is so concerned with racism: tabooing that prevents a genocide of the racial group that is always concerned with that. At the same time, racism functions as a distractor, dividing and conquering the proles. Finally, the white capitalists have long been internationalists, and anti-racism allows them to get the cheap labor and mass markets that keep them in power. It is hard, perhaps impossible to imagine another ideology that doesn’t step on Jews or the material security of the ruling class. Unifying ideologies would leave too much attention left over for the elite class. Any racial ideology scares the Jews. Libertarianism endangers their material security. The other major aspects of progressivism are similarly fine-tuned. For instance, feminism divides and conquers, and weakens white men, and gives the capitalist class a larger wage labor pool.
This should not preclude a more empirical analysis of the origins of progressivism, or liberalism for that matter. Let this instead serve as an educated hypothesis, based off of the priors elaborated on herein.
Likewise, a more rigorous study should be made of neoserf and elite phenotype. The way these people are seems to be often misconceived by analysts, and a clear, empirical portrait of these two groups can help flesh out the realities of power relations. Given the way it appears neoserfs are, ideas contrary to power-elitism are absurd. Proprietors of such ideas can only thrive when it is thought that the average person is intelligent and active, as opposed to stupid and docile.
Finally, the main topic of this essay can never suffer from more investigation. I will most likely do more, if I’m not killed by the Illuminati. At this stage I doubt that will happen, because it doesn’t appear that there is evidence of one “Illuminati” that controls everything. The ruling class is small, and intelligent, but I don’t think they’re genius nor a few dozen. Conspiracies almost certainly exist, and are significant, but it is unlikely, even impossible, that one controls the whole world. Exposed conspiracies such as the Bavarian Illuminati and the Rhode’s Round Table are likely good models for the average active, concealed conspiracy.
Allen, G and Abraham, L. (1971) None Dare Call it Conspiracy.
Antelman, M. (1974) To Eliminate the Opiate, Vol 1.
Antelman, M. (2002) To Eliminate the Opiate, Vol 2.
Asch, S.E. (1951). Effects of group pressure on the modification and distortion of judgments. In H. Guetzkow (Ed.), Groups, leadership and men(pp. 177–190). Pittsburgh, PA:Carnegie Press.
Browich, J.E., and Fortin, J. (2018) Sinclair made dozens of local news anchors recite the same script. https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/02/business/media/sinclair-news-anchors-script.html
Gilens, M., & Page, B. I. (2014). Testing theories of American politics: Elites, interest groups, and average citizens. Perspectives on politics, 12(3), 564-581. https://scholar.princeton.edu/sites/default/files/mgilens/files/gilens_and_page_2014_-testing_theories_of_american_politics.doc.pdf
Goldberg, Z. (2020) How the Media Led the Great Racial Awakening.
Hagger, N. (2003) The Secret Founding of America.
Last, S. (2020) Jewish Influence on American Politics. https://ideasanddata.wordpress.com/2020/05/17/jewish-influence-on-american-politics/
Murdoch, J. (2020) Resignation letter. https://investors.newscorp.com/static-files/95de89bc-7411-4dcb-a2e8-9dd0374e95b8
Quigley, C. (1966) Tragedy and Hope: A History of the World in Our Time.
Robinson, J. (1989) Born in Blood: The Lost Secrets of Freemasonry.
Sutton, A. (1981) Wall Street and the Bolshevik Revolution. http://libgen.rs/book/index.php?md5=F1A8B9542AB5E760611DF7442EBB3354
Sutton, A. (1983) America’s Secret Establishment: An Introduction to the Order of Skull & Bones.
Yates, F. (1972) The Rosicrucian Enlightenment.
Author’s note: forgive the absurdities of some of these volumes. The authors can lapse into unreasonable lines of thought, but they were read for their individual facts, which were all verified before they were repeated.
Pew 1 (blacks) — https://www.pewsocialtrends.org/2016/06/27/5-personal-experiences-with-discrimination/
Pew 2 (women) — https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2017/12/14/gender-discrimination-comes-in-many-forms-for-todays-working-women/
Asch conformity experiments — https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Asch_conformity_experiments
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